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Farmers in middle and high income industrialized countries tend to be heavily 
subsidized by their governments thanks to their important political weight.   
Mexican farmers are not the exception.  Even after the structural reforms of the 
1990s in which the country scrapped policies like guaranteed prices and 
privatized fertilizer firms, farmers in Mexico still receive hundreds of millions of 
dollars per year in transfers.  Some of them take the form of matching grants to 
buy inputs or equipment, through a program called Alianza para el Campo.  
Those producing corn receive a direct transfer per ton sold as 
“commercialization support”; while other important export crops such as coffee 
and sugar are the objects of specific support programs with generous budgets.  
Across the board support takes the form of a zero VAT rate that all the 
agrochemicals enjoy, and, at the center of our argument, a subsidy of more 
than 2/3 the cost of electricity for those irrigating with groundwater, all this on 
top of a zero price for water itself.   
 
The fact that nearly 80% of all water in Mexico is used by agriculture makes the 
pumping subsidy have important effects in the rest of the economy, especially 
where population, industry or the service sector are growing fast and compete 
for the scarce resource.  In Mexico, a country with extensive arid regions and 
where the largest population centers are located in watersheds with medium to 
low levels of rain, irrigation has a large economic and ecological footprint.  The 
economic importance is clear by comparing acreage with productivity.   
Representing only the 25% of total farmland, irrigators produce 53% of all crops 
and take credit for 70% of agricultural exports.  The environmental impacts can 
be related to two main issues: saline water intrusion or arsenic and heavy metal 
pollution caused by overexploitation of aquifers, and reduction in water supply to 
wetlands.  Both issues will be explored in more detail through two cases which 
illustrate in a very clear way how the tradeoffs between conservation and 
economic growth goals can be made worse by the wrong policy choices.    
 
It is important to look first at the institutional context.  To manage irrigation 
water, Mexico has a system of concessions handled by the federal government 
whose stated aim is to limit the total sum of extraction to the maximum 
sustainable yield of each aquifer.  The agency in charge of determining, granting 
and enforcing concessions is the National Water Commission (Comisión Nacional 
   del Agua: CNA), also responsible for delivering water to local governments and 
firms obtaining water directly from the federal waterways.  This system faces 
three key problems: 
 
1.  The first problem is that a large share, approximately 26% of farmers, 
extracts water without actually having a concession.   Their status is 
classified as “in process of regularization”, to soften the fact that what 
they do is illegal extraction and bring them gradually into the fold. That 
process is complicated by what is problem number two:  
2.  In many aquifers, the volume of water that corresponds to the 
concessions given already is greater than the total sustainable yield of the 
aquifer, a problem labeled as “overconcession”.  Caused either by 
miscalculation or corruption over the previous decades, the excess 
groundwater concessions leave the National Water Commission with little 
room to maneuver to both legalize the illegal users and to decide how to 
reduce extraction to the correct level in the aquifers in worst shape.   
3.  On top of that, there is a third major problem.   Even when a farmer does 
have a concession, he or she not always respects the maximum level of 
extraction allocated.  This is just the result of the limited enforcement 
capacity of the CNA which makes farmers face a low probability of being 
caught and fined.    
 
Not all is lost; Ávila, Muñoz and Jaramillo (2004) find evidence that, within its 
enforcement limitations, CNA is still using its resources in the most efficient 
way.  Figure 1 shows the ratio of extraction to concession volumes for a 
sample of irrigation farmers whose information on real extraction levels was 
obtained through indirect calculations on usage questions.  Notice that the 
ratio is nearer to the band between zero and 1 (extraction equal or lower 
than concession) the larger the concession volume.  Small irrigators are the 
ones who cheat more frequently and by a larger margin, extracting on 
average five times their concession levels.  The resulting pattern corresponds 
to one that would be generated by an agency closely watching large users 
while letting smaller, but numerous, fry escape.  If there is a fixed cost for 
monitoring each water user, then the agency is following the most effective 
strategy given a fixed budget. 
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Source:  INE (2005) using data from Colegio de Posgraduados (Colpos 2001) Survey 
of Irrigators. 
 
In this context, the electricity subsidy is giving incentives for farmers to extract 
more water, whether or not they are currently extracting below their concession 
levels, and even if they have no concession at all.  If the aquifer is already or 
close to being overexploited, the subsidy causes an excess demand relative to 
the maximum sustainable yield.   Even if the aquifer still has room for additional 
sustainable extraction, the electricity subsidy causes a social waste of resources: 
it induces an economically inefficient use of water because the additional 
quantity of water it allows to extract is actually yielding agricultural products 
whose market value is less than its total costs of production if the real cost of 
electricity was taken into account.  It is an overall loss of social welfare despite 
the gains of welfare to farmers.  That water would be more productive if used by 
industry, households, either present or future ones. 
 
Table 1 shows the types of agricultural users and their electricity tariffs 
applicable to them.  The general code that identifies the electricity tariff paid by 
irrigation farmers is 09.  In its standard form it has several blocks of increasing 
rates and is applied to all those farmers that have either have no concession or 
have not applied to get the lower tariffs.  The lower tariffs have actually a single 
price for all levels of consumption, and are identified as tariff 9CU for day use, 
and tariff 9N for night time use.   
 
The average cost of generating electricity is 0.63 pesos while average 
transmission costs are estimated to be 0.81 pesos.  The difference between the 
total cost of producing and delivering electricity (an average of Mx$1.44) and 
the fees paid by farmers, times their total electricity consumption, amounts to 
an annual implicit subsidy of US$ 700 million dollars.  The recipients are 
approximately one hundred thousand irrigation farmers, the better off segment 
   of the rural population.  Approximately US$560 million are handed down each 
year to those farmers with groundwater concessions, while US$140 million are 
given to “irregular” farmers.  
 
Table 1: Agricultural Tariff structure 
Tariffs Consumption  Subsidy  Type of agricultural 












27.6 1.5  $140 
With Concession (day 
rate) 
9-CU 0.34  54.2  3.2 
With Concession 
(night rate) 
9-N 0.17  22.9  2.2 
$560 
Total     104.7  6.9  $700 
Source: Federal Electricity Commission, August 2004 
 
Not only there is a regressive distribution of income by favoring irrigation 
farmers vs. those owning only rainfed land.  As it happens with most input 
subsidies, the largest farms receive the largest transfers.  By looking figure 2 we 
can get a sense of the inequality of the distribution of the subsidy.  The top 25 
thousand users receive transfers of more than US$ 18 hundred dollars per year, 
while the 25 thousand least privileged irrigators receive less than US$ 94 per 
year.  A more precise measure of  inequality, the Gini coefficient, is estimated to 
be 0.91 for the electricity subsidy, very close to 1, the maximum level of 
inequality.  The Lorenz Curve, a graphical depiction of inequality linked to the 
Gini coefficient is presented in figure 3.  
 
Figure 2.- 
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The subsidy as a perverse incentive that causes overdraft aquifers 
 
The pumping subsidy prevents the adoption of water-saving technologies 
because water is made artificially cheap, so otherwise profitable investments in 
sprinkler or drip irrigation equipment are rendered useless to the farmer.  Figure 
4 compares the status quo of technology choices of a sample of farmers in 
aquifers that have particular low water tables with the predicted choices they 
would make if the subsidy was reduced to 25% of total cost or if it was 
completely eliminated.   
 
The results of subsidy removal or decoupling are dramatic.  For example, 46% 
of the farmers in the sample had canal irrigation, the least efficient technology 
where two fifths of the water is lost to evaporation or percolation before 
reaching the crops.  The econometric predictions show that if the total subsidy 
was reduced from the current 66%, to just 25% of the real cost, then nearly 
half of those currently using canals would switch to sprinkler irrigation.  If the 
subsidy was completely removed then three quarters of all irrigators would 
adopt the use of sprinklers, and 2% of them would even go beyond sprinklers 
and adopt drip irrigation, raising the use of this technology to 8%, a rate of 
adoption readily seen in richer countries where high value crops are grown in 
arid environments, which is where Mexico grows most of its irrigated crops.   
Water savings of this induced technological change would be significant because 
sprinklers improve average efficiency of 75% and drip irrigation reaches 95%.   
 
   Figure 4.  
Distribution of irrigation technologies within COLPOS sample under 
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These predictions are based on observed behavior.  An empirical study carried 
out by INE and UIA (Muñoz, et al.) looked at the natural experiment of farmers 
in Mexico extracting water at different depths in the different aquifers of the 
country.  Each farmer’s choices, both in irrigation technology as well as total 
water extraction, respond to the implicit prices paid for water through the 
electricity bill.  These “shadow prices” are indeed higher the lower the water 
table, even if they are all subsidized.  So, through the use of econometrics, one 
can predict the change in behavior a farmer would have if facing a higher price 
of electricity (or water) just by looking at the choices of a similar farmer located 
where water is already more costly to extract. 
 
There are other possible reactions to an electricity price increase besides 
adoption of more efficient technologies.  For example, some farmers could 
switch to crops that use less water.  Some others would change the timing of 
irrigation towards dawn or dusk, where there would have less evaporation.   
There are multiple minor repairs to infrastructure that could prove to be cost-
effective actions to save smaller but still important quantities of water.  In 
marginal lands, where crops had little profit margin and were only cultivated 
because of the subsidy, some farmers could reduce the total area planted and 
even a few of them would be closing their operations altogether.  Adding all 
these effects to that of technology change, the INE-UIA study  estimates that in 
the long term, once all desired adaptations are undertaken, the net saving of 
water of doubling the price of electricity, and thus reducing the subsidy to just 
1/3 of total cost, would bring a 19% reduction in water extraction.  Despite this 
inelastic demand for water, the reaction to the decoupling of the subsidy would 
   be enough to bring some aquifers back into equilibrium and buy time for the 
rest.   
 
Not all types of farmers respond in the same way.   The overall effect is the sum 
of the actions taken by all the different type of producers.  The INE-UIA analysis 
shows that larger farmers tend to adapt more rapidly than smaller ones when 
facing a higher price of water.  Size, measured in terms of value of the total 
output of the farm) does have an effect.   We do not know if this is due to 
economies of scale or because larger farmers have more access to credit to pay 
for what is a profitable switch in technologies for any farmer in their 
circumstances.  In any case, if the subsidy was reduced to one quarter of the 
cost of electricity, then each of the farmers that belong to the group that 
includes the 20% largest ones would adopt technology and modify practices in 
order to save on average 33% of the water each one consumes.  In contrast, 
those that belong to the smallest quintile of farmers would only undertake 
actions that would make them save 5% of their water and, if the reason is credit 
constraints and not economies of scale, clearly loosing potential profits through 
missing opportunities to improve water efficiency.  This disparity in the capacity 
to adapt can be dealt with specific credit and training support to smaller 
farmers, but it also highlights the importance of having neutral transfers that 
are part of the decoupling process, an issue that will be discussed later. 
 
 
A clearly unsustainable pattern of groundwater use 
 
In nearly 100 of Mexico’s most important aquifers, the aggregate result of the 
perverse incentives generated by the electricity subsidy and the lack of 
enforcement of the current system of concessions is an excess extraction of 
groundwater from its most important users, above of what nature recharges 
each year.  Figure 5 shows the pattern of overexploitation of aquifers in Mexico.  
All the aquifers where large cities are surrounded by irrigation agriculture are 
heavily overexploited.  So are most of those aquifers in dry areas close to the 
highway system that connect them to these cities, the US border or large ports.  
In the 11 of them in worst shape, extraction rates go from 200% of natural 
recharge all the way up to 800%.  These levels of extraction cannot be 










    
Figure 5: The 188 Most Important Aquifers and their Levels of 
Exploitation 
 
Source: INE, based on CNA “Water Statistics in Mexico” 2005 edition 
 
Figure 5 compares the current status of all aquifers in Mexico with the 
predictions of aggregate extraction once the subsidy is reduced by ½.  Notice 
here how 58 aquifers
a would pass from being at the brink or already 
overexploited to a situation where there would be a margin for expansion, 
either of future industrial or household consumption, or a surplus that would 
replenish the stock and raise the water table again.  The patterns of 
extraction of 28 overexploited aquifers would now become sustainable, and 
although only 3 extremely overexploited aquifers would pass to the next best 
category, for all of them time would have been gained.  Time is important, 
both to avoid facing a crisis unprepared, but also to find other policies to 
reduce overextraction even more, such as subsidizing better technologies or 
actually negotiate the registering and enforcing of concessions.  
 
                                                 
a There is a small, but yet unmeasured, dampening effect, due to the reduced induced recharge    

















Decoupling, not eliminating, the subsidy  
 
Decoupling or reengineering subsidies is a term used by organizations such as 
the OECD and the World Trade Organization to identify the policy measures that 
switch the support to a specific economic sector from one that causes price 
distortions to one that provides neutral transfers.  The best examples of neutral 
transfers are cash payments, allocated using a registry of eligible farms or 
households, and paid either per hectare or per household.  The basic idea is that 
by avoiding distortions to market prices better (in the welfare generating sense) 
decisions will be taken.   
 
A decoupled subsidy still provides support to the groups that legislators, public 
opinion or the executive recognizes as deserving, or to those interest groups 
that lobbied to become beneficiaries.  The fact is that a neutral transfer does not 
distort markets and society gains from this.  From an environmental point of 
view, the gains are rooted in the same idea; there is no use of natural resources 
beyond that where true net welfare is generated.  In the Mexican case, without 
the subsidy more water would be saved and more aquifers would be used in a 
sustainable way, while the neutral transfer would leave farmers as well-off as 
before.   
 
Where would the budget for the neutral transfers come from?  It would come 
from the additional revenues generated by the price increase.  It is not just 
making the money go from farmers to the government and back again.  The 
price signals have now changed and the incentives to save water (or the input 
whose support is being decoupled) are now in place.  The transfer in any case 
would make it easier for the farmer to undertake the investment in new 
equipment that now does look profitable.   
 
   Because we know that smaller farms would react less than larger farmers, then 
we would observe the former absorbing most of the electricity cost increment.  
This makes the handling and timing of the neutral transfer all the more 
important.  Having them receive the transfer and later paying it back almost 
entirely to the government would not ruin the effect of the decoupling; it is the 
aggregate effect that one is after, not the same reaction from all farmers.   
 
Delivering a decoupled subsidy is more complex that providing one through 
input prices.  It requires a payment vehicle which is stable, objective and 
minimizes the risk of fraud.  An ex-professo list was created to deliver a 
payment per hectare under a program called PROCAMPO, as part of the policy to 
decouple all the guaranteed prices in agriculture in the face of NAFTA.   
PROCAMPO was more progressive than the output price policy because it paid 
the same per hectare to all farmers no matter what their productivity was, thus 
benefiting the poorest and less input intensive producers.  However, it still 
needed to put a cap on transfers per household to avoid following the same 
distribution as land ownership.   
 
Which payment vehicle would work best for the case of decoupling the irrigation 
subsidy?  It could be land, as in the output decoupling case, but it is difficult to 
measure without fraud how much land were the owners irrigating.  It could be 
the amount of water stated in the concession itself.  That would make more 
sense and would actually be punishing those cheating and extracting more water 
than their concession.  For those irrigating with no concession at all it would 
provide no relief.  This is a major political feasibility weakness because of the 
large share that these two groups represent.  The decoupling program could be 
patched by creating a transition payment per hectare for those in the 
“regularization” process, and by providing extra funds for the smaller irrigations, 
which we know are the ones that cheat the most.   
 
Equity is indeed a key point for the political feasibility of the decoupling of the 
irrigation subsidy.  More equity actually worked well for the output subsidy 
decoupling.  Enough poor peasants saw it as better for them, and their 
representatives supported the measure.  The largest farmers were chastised for 
not being competitive in front of an inevitable NAFTA process, and were asked to 
move to export crops instead.  However in the case of water it is not clear it 
w o u l d  w o r k  i n  t h e  s a m e  w a y .   I f  i t  i s  a  s i n g l e  p a y m e n t  p e r  m
3  of water in 
concession, with the fixed budget coming form the additional electricity 
revenues, then those in the most overexploited aquifers will loose.  They spend 
more electricity to extract every m
3 than those that have land where the water 
table is higher.  There could be some regional differentiation, but too much 
would be vulnerable to criticism of unequal treatment of “equal” farmers.   
 
An additional challenge for the decoupling proposal comes from what any policy 
maker would perceive as a desirable attribute of any subsidy: transparency.  A 
transparent subsidy is a vulnerable subsidy, even more if there is a clear -and 
difficult to justify- disparity between the already richer irrigation farmers and the 
much larger and poorer group of farmers with rainfed lands.  Such a transparent 
   decoupled subsidy could attract public opinion outcries, legislator challenges and 
protests from the rest of the farmers, because of its inherent inequality.  A 
price-of-input subsidy instead has the advantage for the privileged group that it 
hides these transfers, making it appear as a matter of justice that the 
government should not “price to high” the inputs it provides to farmers. The 
money is allocated through the budget assigned to the public utilities, not 
handed openly to irrigators. Those irrigators opposed to a net gains decoupled 
subsidy are thinking in the looks in the face of their peers when they receive in 
the open a check for US$5,000, just for being lucky enough to have a (also free) 
water concession, instead of receiving the same subsidy hidden in their 
quarterly electricity bill.   
 
These political feasibility challenges need to be met, most likely by a policy 
entrepreneur willing to absorb the political costs of antagonizing the most 
privileged of farmers under the status quo, with the goal in sight of saving from 
collapse the aquifers that maintain most of the population and the industrial and 
service sector part of the economy.  
 
 
CASE STUDIES  
 
A summary of two case studies will be presented to illustrate the consequences 
of aquifer overexploitation caused by the aforementioned policy failures.  In the 
case of the aquifer of Hermosillo, Sonora, the costs of overexploitation are loss 
of prime agricultural land because of the induced saline intrusion.   In the 
second case, the threatened aquifer of Cuatrociénegas, Coahuila supports 




Tragedy of the commons in Hermosillo, Sonora 
 
Agriculture in the dry climate state of Sonora in Mexico’s Northwest depends 
almost exclusively on groundwater.  The coastal region, well connected to the 
highway system that links Mexico to the U.S. market, is a major producer of 
corn, tomatoes and other high value vegetable crops.  In the 1960s the water 
could be extracted at a depth of 11 m. and farmers treated it as an endless 
supply.  However, by the 1980s water table levels were dropping fast, while the 
economy of the area kept growing.  Corn productivity was among the highest in 
the country, and tomato became the most important cash crop.  The 
liberalization of international markets, first with GATT and next by NAFTA, 
further increased demand.  This is the time when the water policy failures 
exacerbated a crisis that should have just been a story of successful growth, 
increased relative scarcity and the following investment to increase water 
productivity.  A response that market signals could have solved in a simple, 
direct way, was now in the realm of a vicious circle in which farmers facing 
increasing pumping costs asked for more subsidies, especially in electricity; the 
government responded, and thus new entrants to the tomato business were 
   happy, while incumbents were kept content, but the aquifer kept being drawn 
down.   
 
All this would have found a limit in any other aquifer, once the electricity 
subsidies became too outrageous or were stopped by the requirement to offer 
the same treatment to all regions.  However, in a coastal aquifer such as the 
Hermosillo one, the overexploitation crossed a threshold that changed the 
direction of the water flows, normally going from the land to the ocean.  In the 
late 1990s water had to be pumped from 135 m. from the ground, and the 
Hermosillo aquifer was now 58 m. below sea level.  Saline intrusion began, first 
in the areas nearer to the coast, with accumulated effects that eventually 
rendered those fields unusable.  As it progressed further into the land it sounded 
high an alarm to those farmers in the vicinity.  Their fields, already connected by 
the road infrastructure that had been built thanks to the wealth they were 
generating, were going to be lost in timeframes measured in years, not decades.     
 
The National Water Commission had the same imperfect enforcement capacity 
as it had nationwide, but now it was bolstered by a concerned State government 
and the farmers that were coming to realize that the free rider situation that all 
enjoyed was really a tragedy of the commons in the making.  One of the very 
clear lines of reaction to the crisis was to have CNA prohibit the opening of new 
wells and begin to close down some of the existing ones.  Some were closed by 
nature, the salinization process still advanced relentless, but the rest needed to 
be closed by decree.  Needless to say, there would have been no need to close 
any wells if extraction limits could be actually strictly enforced, and there was a 
way to reduce the concessions in a proportional way.   
 
Collective action for farmers to support the agency was made easier by the 
formation of an aquifer-level association.  In that way it was easier for farmers 
themselves to negotiate who would close down and who would still produce.   
Agribusiness firms posed no problem; they were actually closing down their 
rental contracts in the most affected areas and renting new land further away 
from the coast.  The water markets opened by the new Water Law began to 
operate more and more, as a way to cope with scarcity.  Some traded the right 
to salinized water for wells farther away from the land, avoiding personal losses 
but not contributing to the solution really.   
 
Central to the actions to solve the crisis is the issue of compensation.  If a 
farmer had to choose between closing a well now and having saline intrusion 
closing it in 5 years, there was no question of what she would do.  A few years 
more of production, even with diminishing profits, was better than zero.   
Compensating losers is a sound economic proposition for the rest of farmers: 
the present value of their gains is greater than the foregone profits of those 
closing their wells.  In the end, the federal agencies provided the public good of 
compensating some farmers that closed their operations, giving a net transfer 
(using taxpayers’ money) to those who had been responsible for the crisis they 
now faced.    
 
   The situation at the Hermosillo aquifer is not sustainable yet.  The city still 
grows and without expansion of the supply apparently collapse was averted, but 
the low water table implies that only the richest farmers, with more powerful 
pumps, have access to the still heavily subsidized water 
 
 
The case of Cuatrociénegas, Coahuila 
 
The dryland valleys of north-central Mexico contain some of the most diverse 
desert ecosystems in the world.  Even among this diversity the desert wetlands 
of Cuatrociénegas stand out.  The ancient aquifer emerges as a series of desert 
springs, streams and ponds where freshwater bacteria, mollusks and fish have 
existed in relative isolation from other large bodies of water for thousands of 
miles and for several million years, giving place to what are now a fair number 
of endemic species.  The research value of such a natural experiment of oasis 
evolution is enormous, as is its bequest value for future generations.  Even if the 
springs have been isolated from lagoons, rivers and oceans for very long periods 
of time, they might not be isolated from neighboring aquifers –or so believe 
scientists like Valeria Souza, who has analyzed the genes of bacteria and archea 
in the area- thus making them indirectly vulnerable to the overexploitation of 
groundwater taking place by the surrounding agricultural activities.  However, 
there is more than one scientific opinion on this matter.  For the Instituto 
Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua (IMTA), a government research center 
specialized in water issues, geohidrological tests show no sign of current 
physical link between the Cuatrociénegas aquifer and any of the neighboring 
ones used for irrigation agriculture.   
 
In recent years the political stakes of this scientific debate have been raised by 
the actions taken by a group of alfalfa growers in order to expand their 
operations in the neighboring Valle del Hundido valley.  Alfalfa is grown in the 
Mexican drylands because the most common practice is to allow cattle to browse 
free in the rangeland during rainy season while supplementing food the rest of 
the year.  The market for alfalfa in the central Coahuila region had been growing 
over the years due to the greater demand for meat in the dynamic urban 
centers of the region and a more open trade in cattle with the US after NAFTA.  
Additionally, the arsenic and heavy metal pollution crisis of some of the large 
aquifers in the region, brought about by their overexploitation like in the case of 
La Laguna, has also put pressure in moving production to the minor aquifers in 
the periphery.  Importing alfalfa into the region is not cost effective, because 
transportation costs are high relative to their value per kilogram, so there is 
pressure to produce as locally as possible.  All this economic forces combined 
with the artificial economic feasibility of opening new wells brought about by the 
electricity subsidy explain the current potential threat on a Mexican hotspot of 
biodiversity.   
 
The area is not without protection, and the favorable outcome of the latest clash 
of interests between biodiversity conservation and expansion of cattle ranching 
activities is certainly due to the constituency formed around the objective of 
   preservation of the area.  Thanks to the national and international scientific 
community who drew attention to Cuatrociénegas’ uniqueness, it was declared a 
Natural Protected Area in 1994, under the federal system of protected areas.  
This gave the possibility to the Federal Attorney for the Environment (PROFEPA), 
the enforcement agency of the Ministry of the Environment and Natural 
Resources, to step in when complaints were filed about the opening of more 
than 100 new wells in Valle del Hundido.  The farmers, and their local and State 
government supporters, argued that there was no proof of connection between 
the Cuatrociénegas and Valle del Hundido aquifers, and that this was enough to 
continue with the expansion plans of more than ten thousand hectares of alfalfa 
fields.  The research undertaken by IMTA brought further support to their 
argument, and weakened the federal case.  There was an unclear situation to 
add to the issue though, because the alfalfa growers held recent groundwater 
concessions granted by the National Water Commission, and these are supposed 
not to be issued when aquifers, like the Valle del Hundido one, are considered at 
risk from overexploitation.  However, the case for conservation had solid but 
partial gains thanks to an error made by some alfalfa growers when they cleared 
the land and opened the wells without filing a request for land use change, a 
request that must include an Environmental Impact Assessment.  Their 
counterargument that there was no valuable biodiversity in their lands was 
easily turned down because the diversity of cacti of the area was well known.  
Those farmers had to stop the construction of new wells, restore the desert 
vegetation, and forget about the new alfalfa fields.    
 
The Cuatrociénegas case clearly illustrates the difficult choices that have to be 
made when scientific knowledge about the connectedness of aquifers is still 
incomplete.  On the one hand, the increase in demand brought about by 
economic growth and trade puts pressure to open new irrigation fields as soon 
as possible, proceeding without delay especially if there is no evident connection 
between aquifers.  On the other hand, the precautionary principle would dictate 
that any decision regarding the authorization of additional extraction should wait 
until more information is generated.  Mexico is dedicating resources to research 
through institutions like INE, IMTA and the SEMARNAT - National Council for 
Science and Technology (CONACYT) research fund, so information should be 
becoming available with time.  Nevertheless, a larger budget dedicated to these 
critical issues would certainly help shorten the wait.  However, common sense 
and the search for economic efficiency are the best way out of the conundrum.  
In the first place, if electricity was priced at its real production and distribution 
costs then fewer wells would be profitable, and a decoupled subsidy could be 
used to increase efficiency in the current ones.  Finally, if the policy was not to 
let any aquifer become overexploited, then there would be economic benefits to 
current and future users as a group while society is assured that no damage is 
done to any biodiversity-valuable conservation aquifer in case they are 
connected.  True natural resource scarcity needs to be taken into account by 
firms and consumers to bring about the changes in behavior and tap into human 
ingenuity so growth will bring more welfare to the people without compromising 
the future generation’s capacity to do the same. 
 
   